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1 Introduction
Financial development has positive impacts on economic growth and poverty
alleviation (Levine 2005). Establishing well-functioning credit markets should
therefore be a critical role of governments. The level of nancial development,
however, varies across countries and changes non-monotonically over time. A
growing body of literature strongly suggests that these changes are at least
partly due to policy changes in nancial sectors (e.g., Rajan and Zingales
2003), and some studies have developed theoretical models in which the level
of investor protection, a determinant of nancial development, is politically
chosen. In macroeconomics literature, on the other hand, political processes
that formulate policies toward nancial development are usually abstracted,
and the focus is on the eects of an exogenously given level of nancial devel-
opment on economic growth, income distributions, etc. Building on these two
strands of literature, this paper proposes a tractable model to analyze inter-
actions between politically determined nancial development and economic
development.
Asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, such as costly
state verication and moral hazard, is the source of credit market imper-
fections, as shown by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Aghion, Banerjee, and
Piketty (1999), Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), and others.1 In
these theories, the costs of gathering information and monitoring borrowers
directly inuence the amount entrepreneurs can borrow from nancial inter-
mediaries. An important implication is that policies that reduce the costs
of nancial intermediation can relax borrowing constraints. For example,
improving investor protection, establishing public credit registries and pro-
viding partial credit guarantee systems to ease asymmetric information can
benet credit markets. The next section reviews theory and evidence on the
eectiveness of such policies.
1Karlan and Zinman (2009) nd evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection in
credit markets.
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We take the view that the size of policies to improve credit markets is
determined in political processes. Credit market imperfections prevent poor
individuals from starting businesses, and thus serve as a barrier to entry. Ra-
jan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbents in industries oppose nancial
development because new entries create erce competition and reduce the
returns of the incumbents. On the basis of the analysis by Rajan and Zin-
gales (2003), Braun and Raddatz (2008) empirically show that the stronger
the relative power of promoters of nancial development, the larger nan-
cial systems become. Perotti and Volpin (2004) develop a model in which
incumbents, who have sucient wealth to set up rms, engage in lobbying
activities in order to lower the level of investor protection.2
Although these politico-economic studies identify determinants of nan-
cial development, they do not investigate the eects of nancial development
on the patterns of economic development, which is one of the central issues in
the macroeconomic literature (Galor and Zeira 1993, Banerjee and Newman
1993, Aghion and Bolton 1997). We propose a model to examine conditions
in which a government policy to improve imperfect credit markets is practiced
through a democratic political process and analyze interactions between the
politically implemented policy and economic development. With regard to
the political process, we consider majority voting as in Pagano and Volpin
(2005). This is because most countries adopt generally democratic political
systems, and the investigation of politico-economic outcomes under majority
voting serves as a benchmark.
The model employs an overlapping generations model inhabited by indi-
viduals who live for two periods. The economy produces a single nal good
by using capital and labor. In the rst period, individuals inelastically sup-
2The conicts between incumbents and entrants are not the only factor that matters
for nancial development, as analyzed by Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Bebchuk and
Neeman (2010). In particular, Pagano and Volpin (2005) consider majority voting games,
as this paper does. Besley and Persson (2009, 2010) investigate a situation in which a
group in power chooses the amount of investment in legal capacity, which determines the
severity of borrowing constraints.
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ply labor to the nal good sector and earn wages, the amount of which is
dierent across the individuals because of the heterogeneity in their labor
endowments. Individuals then decide whether to make a xed size of invest-
ment that produces capital in the next period. All individuals, however, face
borrowing constraints because credit markets are imperfect, which creates a
threshold income level; only individuals with incomes above the threshold
can invest in the project. Before making investment decisions, individuals
vote for or against a government policy that improves the credit markets. In
the second period, the returns from the project are realized and individuals
consume their entire resulting wealth.
The imperfect credit markets work as an entry barrier as argued by Ra-
jan and Zingales (2003), and the policy that mitigates the imperfection has
dierent eects on dierent individuals. On one hand, the policy benets
individuals who can start the project only after the implementation of the
policy. Such individuals are likely to be middle income individuals. On the
other hand, it decreases the welfare of the rich who do not need to borrow
much because the improvement of the credit markets enables more individu-
als to invest, i.e., facilitates new entry, and reduces the return on the project.
Because the poor who are still not able to invest even if the government im-
proves the credit markets do not have any incentive to support the policy,
they may vote against it together with the rich who wish to block new entry.3
Whether the policy can obtain majority support strongly depends on the
extent of income inequality. When income inequality is high and income
levels across individuals are widely dispersed, a given level of improvement
in the credit markets enables only a small portion of individuals to begin the
project. It is therefore dicult for the policy to obtain majority support. As
a natural consequence, dynamic analysis of the model shows that the higher
income inequality is, the less capital is accumulated, and the more likely it is
3Such political conict, ends against the middle, arises in a model by Bellettini and Berti
Ceroni (2007), who analyze the provision of public goods that enhance future productivity.
4
that the economy will fall into poverty traps. This result that high income
inequality is harmful to nancial and economic development agrees with the
evidence by Easterly (2001, 2007).
Our analysis can also be associated with a number of studies that ana-
lyzed the eects of income inequality on economic development in political
economics frameworks. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994) developed models in which high income inequality is detrimental to
economic growth because the inequality raises demand for redistribution by
the median voter; this redistribution discourages private investments. This
mechanism is, however, not empirically supported (e.g., Perotti 1996). Al-
though we obtain the result that income inequality is harmful to economic
development, the mechanism in this paper is dierent from that of the re-
distribution approach shown in the previous studies. This paper therefore
proposes a new mechanism to explain the negative relationship between in-
equality and economic development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews how
governments can improve credit markets. Section 3 describes the model, and
Section 4 characterizes the static equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes equilibrium
dynamics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Policies toward Financial Development
This section reviews government policies that can improve credit markets.
One of the eective policies is improving laws and institutions, as creditor
protections and legal enforcement are determinants of nancial development
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, Levine 1998, 1999).
The importance of the factors has been examined by a vast number of recent
studies, both theoretically and empirically. The model developed by Jap-
pelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005) predicts that improvements of eciency in
judicial enforcement unambiguously reduce credit constraints and increase
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lending regardless of whether the competition structure in credit markets
is perfectly competitive or monopolistic. They also present supporting ev-
idence from panel data on Italian provinces. Using 25 years of data for
129 countries, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) nd that strong cred-
itor protections have a positive impact on the private credit to GDP ratio.
Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010) focus on twelve transition economies to
investigate how banks respond to legal changes and nd, consistent with the
conclusions of Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), that improvements in
creditor protections promote bank lending.4
There are other policies that improve credit markets even in cases where
changing the legal environment is dicult. The creation of public credit reg-
istries to enforce information sharing among lenders is a promising govern-
ment intervention, particularly in countries with weak investor protections.
Public credit registries are operated by a government authority, usually the
central bank or a banking supervisory agency, that collects data on the stand-
ing of borrowers and makes it available to nanciers.5 Theories suggest that
such credit registries can benet credit markets. First, information sharing
should reduce adverse selection and decrease defaults (Pagano and Jappelli
1993). Second, the exchange of information may reduce informational rents
that banks can extract from their clients within credit relationships when
the banks have an informational monopoly. The ercer competition caused
by information sharing weakens the bargaining power of banks, which mo-
tivates borrowers to exert greater eorts to perform (Padilla and Pagano
1997). Finally, sharing default information among lenders should discipline
borrowers to make greater eorts to repay because defaulting is a bad signal
to all outside lenders (Padilla and Pagano 2000).
Empirical studies generally support the hypothesis that credit registries
4The legal reforms in the transition countries are motivated by pressures from outside
their governing bodies, and the timing of the reforms is arguably more exogenous.
5Jappelli and Pagano (2002) provide a detailed description of credit registries around
the world.
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foster credit market performance. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) nd that bank
lending is larger in countries where lenders share information. More recently,
the evidence of Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), to which we have re-
ferred above, shows that information-sharing institutions are associated with
higher private credit to GDP ratios. For micro evidence, using rm-level data
in transition countries, Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) nd that infor-
mation sharing is associated with credit availability. Moreover, in order to
obtain clear condence on causality between information sharing and credit
market performance, Brown and Zehnder (2007) apply experimental meth-
ods to examine the eect of the exogenous introduction of a credit registry
and show that the credit registry can motivate borrowers to repay their loans.
Another policy we are aware of is partial credit guarantee systems. To the
extent that they give opportunities to learn how to lend to new borrowers,
they are interpreted as subsidies to investments in screening methods (De la
Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler 2007).
Although government direct lending is a possible policy, its performance
is generally poor, and the policy leads to lower levels of nancial development
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). Because supporting private
nanciers is considerably more important than lending by government-owned
banks, we focus on a situation in which the government fosters private nan-
cial transactions rather than replacing them.
3 Basic Environments
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which individuals live
for two periods. They are heterogeneous only with respect to their labor en-
dowments. Labor should be broadly interpreted to include any endowments
whose equilibrium values increase with the level of capital, and capital should
be broadly interpreted to include human capital and any capital good (Mat-
suyama 2004). The distribution of the labor endowments does not vary over
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time and follows a uniform distribution on the support [h; h]. Let G(hi) de-
note the cumulative distribution function of hi. We normalize the average
labor endowment to one, which implies h = 2  h.
3.1 Final good sector
A single nal good is produced by using capital and labor as inputs, and the
production technology takes the form of a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yt = k

t l
1 
t ; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where yt is the output, kt and lt are capital and labor input, respectively, and
in equilibrium, lt =
R h
h
hidG(hi) = 1 by the normalization. The nal good
and factor markets are perfectly competitive, which leads to
t = k
 1
t  (kt); (2)
wt = (1  )kt  w(kt); (3)
where t and wt are the price of capital and the wage, respectively. Capital
depreciates fully in one period.
3.2 Individuals
Economic environments for individuals are based on Matsuyama (2004). In-
dividuals live for two periods but derive utility only from consumption in the
second period of their lives. In the rst period, individuals born in period
t with hi supply their labor inelastically and earn w(kt)hi. Individuals can
invest in at most one project. The project is nondivisible and transforms
one unit of the nal good in the current period into R units of capital in
the next period. At the end of the period t, individuals decide whether to
invest in the project. They can lend and borrow at the gross interest rate r
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determined in international nancial markets; we set r = 1 for simplicity. In
the second period, they retire and consume their entire wealth.
Since the project to produce capital requires one unit of the xed in-
vestment cost, individuals whose income is less than one borrow in order to
invest in the project. The amount individual i needs to borrow, bit, in order
to invest in the project is given by bit = 1  w(kt)hi.
Although individuals can lend and borrow at the world interest rate r = 1,
there exists a borrowing limit due to information asymmetry between lenders
and borrowers. Specically, any individual is able to borrow only up to a con-
stant, t, times his or her disposable income, as shown by Aghion, Banerjee,
and Piketty (1999), and Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005):
bit  tw(kt)hi: (4)
We call this inequality the borrowing constraint. The parameter t is com-
monly called the credit multiplier, and it represents the extent of nancial
development. The borrowing constraint disappears as t goes to innity,
whereas t = 0 corresponds to the other polar case in which credit is totally
unavailable and individuals can only invest their own disposable income. An-
alyzing models with moral hazard, Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999), and
Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) derive the constant credit mul-
tiplier and show that borrowing constraints take the form of (4).6 In these
studies, ex-post moral hazard is the source of credit market imperfections,
and lower monitoring costs and stronger investor protections are associated
with a larger credit multiplier. The borrowing constraint (4) implies that
individuals whose labor endowments are less than the threshold, ~h(t; kt),
6The constant credit multiplier is a standard way to introduce borrowing constraints
in the literature. For example, see De Gregorio (1996), Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty
(1999), Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), Caballe, Jarque, and Michetti (2006),
Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007), and Antras and Caballero (2009, 2010).
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cannot invest in the project:
~h(t; kt)  1
1 + t
1
w(kt)
: (5)
3.3 Government
The government can practice a policy that improves credit markets as de-
scribed in Section 2. In concrete terms, the government can improve laws,
establish public credit registries, and oer partial credit guarantee systems.7
Suppose that the government can raise the credit multiplier, t, from L
to H by improving the credit markets. For simplicity, we set L = 0 and
denote H =  > 0. The thresholds under the improved and unimproved
credit markets are respectively given by ~h(; kt)  1=[(1 + )w(kt)] and
~h(0; kt)  1=w(kt). Both thresholds, ~h(; kt) and ~h(0; kt), are decreasing in
kt. That is, the higher the capital level is, the more individuals are able to
invest in the project since their wages are increasing in capital.
4 Static Analysis
4.1 Market clearing conditions
Individuals who are able to invest in the project are those with labor endow-
ments greater than or equal to ~h(0; kt) if the government does not improve
the credit markets. Given that all individuals whose labor endowments are
~h(0; kt) or above are willing to invest in the project, the capital good market
clears if
k0t+1 = Rf1 G[~h(0; kt)]g; (6)
7All such policies should reduce screening and monitoring costs of nancial interme-
diaries. For a recent theoretical research that provides implications of the policies on
nancial development, see Michalopoulos, Laeven, and Levine (2009).
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where k0t+1 is the level of capital at period t+1 under the condition that the
government does not improve the credit markets at period t. Individuals are
willing to invest in the project if the return is greater than or equal to the
deposit interest rate r = 1, i.e.,
R(k0t+1)  1 , k0t+1  (R)
1
1   k: (7)
We call this inequality the protability condition. Individuals whose labor en-
dowments are greater than or equal to ~h(; kt) are now able to invest in the
project if the government improves the credit markets. The capital good mar-
ket clearing condition and the protability condition are respectively given
by
kt+1 = Rf1 G[~h(; kt)]g; (8)
R(kt+1)  1 , kt+1  k; (9)
where kt+1 is the level of capital at period t + 1 under the condition that
the government improves the credit markets at period t. Note that the
improvement of the credit markets enables more individuals to invest in the
project, which increases the level of capital in the next period and reduces
the return from capital: kt+1 > k
0
t+1 and (k

t+1) < (k
0
t+1).
4.2 Voting behavior
Individuals who support nancial development are identied by two thresh-
olds, ~h(; kt) and ~h(0; kt). First, let us consider the preferences of individuals
with hi < ~h(; kt). They are unable to invest in the project regardless of the
government policy and hence do not care about the value of t. We assume
that such individuals are against the policy in order to simplify our model
analysis.8 These individuals thus prefer t = 0. Next, let us investigate the
8This assumption can be easily justied by introducing an arbitrary small cost, which
must be levied by taxation, to improve the credit markets. Since individuals with hi <
~h(; kt) cannot invest even if they bear a tax burden to develop the credit markets, they
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political preferences of individuals with ~h(; kt)  hi < ~h(0; kt). These indi-
viduals can invest in the project only if the government improves the credit
markets. As long as the protability condition is satised, they prefer bor-
rowing funds and investing in the project to lending their own money. We
assume the value of the productivity parameter R is suciently high that
the return of capital exceeds r = 1 even if all individuals invest in the project
(i.e., kt+1 = R):
R(R) > 1 , R > (1=) 1 : (A.1)
Under (A.1), individuals with ~h(; kt)  hi < ~h(0; kt) always prefer t = .
Finally, individuals with hi  ~h(0; kt) prefer t = 0. They can invest without
the government policy, which only reduces their return on investment because
(kt+1) < (k
0
t+1).
Proposition 1 Under (A.1), individuals with ~h(; kt)  hi < ~h(0; kt) prefer
t = , while individuals with hi < ~h(; kt) and those with hi  ~h(0; kt)
prefer t = 0.
Proposition 1 states that preferences for the policy are not monotonic
over income levels and that political conict, ends against the middle, can
arise, as in Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007).
The attitude of individuals toward the policy is dependent on capital
levels since the thresholds, ~h(; kt) and ~h(0; kt), are functions of kt. It is par-
ticularly useful to dene the following four levels of capital, which summarize
the magnitude relation among the two thresholds and the upper and lower
limit of labor endowments, h and h, as we will associate the support rate of
the policy with capital levels. Comparing the two thresholds, h and h, yields
the following results:
~h(; kt) < h , kt > [(1 + )(1  )h] 
1
  k(; h); (10)
strictly prefer t = 0. In order to keep the model simple, we abstract the cost and taxation.
This does not aect our results.
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~h(; kt) > h , kt <

(1 + )(1  )h  1  k(; h); (11)
~h(0; kt) < h , kt > [(1  )h] 
1
  k(0; h); (12)
~h(0; kt) > h , kt <

(1  )h  1  k(0; h): (13)
The inequality ~h(; kt) < h in (10) states that even the poorest individuals
can invest in the project as long as the government improves the credit mar-
kets. Expression (10) hence means that implementation of the policy allows
all individuals to invest in the project if the level of capital is higher than
k(; h). The inequality ~h(; kt) > h in (11) states that the richest individ-
uals cannot invest in the project even under the improved credit markets.
Expression (11) hence means the policy cannot enable any individuals to
invest in the project if the level of capital is lower than k(; h). Similarly,
expression (12) means that if the level of capital is higher than k(0; h), all
individuals can invest in the project even if the government does not improve
the credit markets. Expression (13) means that if the level of capital is lower
than k(0; h), no individual can invest in the project unless the government
improves the credit markets. Expressions (10)-(13) imply k(; h) < k(0; h)
and k(; h) < k(0; h), but the magnitude relation between k(0; h) and k(; h)
depends on the value of h, i.e., h < 2=(2 + ) implies k(0; h) < k(; h), and
h  2=(2 + ) implies k(0; h)  k(; h).
4.3 The support rate
Let us discuss the support rate for the policy to improve the credit markets
in the case of h < 2=(2 + ); that is, k(0; h) < k(; h). Under majority
voting, the policy to improve the credit markets is implemented if at least
half of young individuals support it, and rejected otherwise.9 The support
rate is a function of capital kt since ~h(; kt) and ~h(0; kt) depend on kt. It is
9Note that old individuals are not interested in the government policy in the current
period because they have already chosen whether to invest in the project. We assume that
the government policy is implemented if half of young individuals support it.
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useful to remember expressions (10){(13) in order to identify the attitudes of
individuals toward the policy. It should be also noted that individuals who
can invest in the project only through the implementation of the policy vote
in favor of it and the others vote against it.
To calculate the density of individuals who support the policy, or the
support rate, ve cases need to be considered according to the value of kt.
First, when 0  kt < k(; h), the policy enables no individual to invest in the
project. Second, when k(; h)  kt < k(0; h), the policy enables individuals
with ~h(; kt)  hi  h to start the project. Third, when k(0; h)  kt <
k(; h), individuals with ~h(; kt)  hi < ~h(0; kt) can invest only with the
assistance of the policy. Fourth, when k(; h)  kt < k(0; h), individuals
who can run the project only through the assistance of the policy are those
with h  hi < ~h(0; kt). Finally, when k(0; h)  kt, all individuals are able
to invest in the project regardless of the government policy. Based on the
above analysis, the support rate function S(k) is represented as
S(kt) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if 0  kt < k(; h);
S1(kt) 
R h
~h(;kt)
dG(hi) =
1
2(1 h)
 
2  h  1
1+
1
1 k
 
t

if k(; h)  kt < k(0; h);
S2(kt) 
R ~h(0;kt)
~h(;kt)
dG(hi) =
1
2(1 h)

1+
1
1 k
 
t
if k(0; h)  kt < k(; h);
S3(kt) 
R ~h(0;kt)
h
dG(hi) =
1
2(1 h)
 
1
1 k
 
t   h

if k(; h)  kt < k(0; h);
0 if k(0; h)  kt:
(14)
Figure 1 depicts the features of the support rate function S(k). The support
rate function can be obtained in the case of 2=(2 + )  h  1 in a similar
manner, but we omit the derivation.
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5 Dynamic Analysis
This section identies the politically determined government policy by using
the support rate function S(k) depicted in Figure 1 and analyzes interactions
between the policy and economic development. The level of income inequality
plays a crucial role in the analysis of the policy because it aects the shape
of the support rate function.10 Note that the smaller h, the larger income
inequality. In what follows, we consider each of the three cases: low (Case
1), moderate (Case 2), and high (Case 3) levels of income inequality. Figure
2 illustrates these patterns.
Case 1: Low level of income inequality
First, let us consider the politically determined policy under a low level of
income inequality. Specically, the income inequality is so small that 1=(1 +
)  h < 2=(2 + ). This inequality implies S2[k(; h)]  1=2. Let kA and
kB respectively denote the capital levels satisfying the following equalities:
S1(kA) =
1
2
, kA =

1
1 + 
1
1  
 1

; S3(kB) =
1
2
, kB =

1
1  
 1

:
If 0  kt < kA, the support rate is less than 1=2, and t = 0 is chosen. Under
the low capital level, the economy is poor as a whole, and most individuals
are unable to invest even with the assistance of the policy. The government
policy can only benet a small portion of relatively rich individuals and does
not obtain majority support. If kA  kt  kB, in contrast, the support
rate is greater than or equal to 1=2, and t =  is realized. Under this
capital level, a majority of individuals are able to invest in the project only
through improving the credit markets, and they therefore support the policy.
10If there is no borrowing constraint but income inequality, all individuals can borrow
enough in order to invest in the project, and the level of capital converges to R in one
period.
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If kt > kB, the support rate is again less than half, and t = 0 is chosen. This
is because the economy is well-developed and a large portion of individuals
can invest regardless of the government policy.
In order to keep the below analysis simple, we impose the following ad-
ditional assumption on parameters:
2kA < R < kB: (A.2)
The rst inequality, 2kA < R, means that the improvement of the credit
markets makes capital stock in the next period greater than that in the cur-
rent period if kt = kA, where the policy begins to obtain majority support.
The second inequality, R < kB, implies that the support rate for the gov-
ernment policy becomes more than 1/2, and t =  if the economy develops
suciently that all individuals in the previous period invest in the project.
(A.2) implies that  > 2   1, and (A.1) and (A.2) imply  > 1=2.11
Under (A.2), t = 0 if 0  kt < kA, and t =  if kA  kt  R. The
dynamic equation of capital is given by
kt+1 =
8><>:
0 if 0  kt < kA;
R
2(1 h)
 
2  h  1
1+
1
1 k
 
t
  F1(kt; h) if kA  kt < minfR; k(; h)g;
R if minfR; k(; h)g  kt < R:
(15)
The third line in (15) is valid if the interval [minfR; k(; h)g; R) is non-
empty. Depending on the values of R and k(; h), there are two possible
dynamics as depicted in Figure 3. Notice that k(; h) is decreasing in h
and moves from kB down to ~k  (2 + )1=[2(1 + )(1   )] 1= < kB as h
changes from 1=(1 + ) to 2=(2 + ). When maxf~k; 2kAg  R, the dynamics
can correspond to Figure 3 (a) or (b). That is, the dynamics correspond
to Figure 3 (a) if income inequality is relatively low in Case 1, such that
11Since we interpret capital broadly to include human capital and any capital good, as
in Matsuyama (2004),  > 1=2 is not so restrictive.
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k(; h)  R, and they correspond to Figure 3 (b) if income inequality is
relatively high, such that k(; h) > R.12 When R < ~k, k(; h) > R for
all h in Case 1 and the dynamics correspond to Figure 3 (b). The results in
Case 1 may theoretically explain the bilateral causality between nancial and
economic development found by Calderon and Liu (2003). Capital stock must
be at least above kA for the policy to be supported, which suggests causality
from economic development to nancial development. Obviously, nancial
development stimulates investments, which causes economic development. It
is easy to show that the dynamic equation of capital is also given by (15) in
the case of 2=(2 + )  h  1.
Case 2: Moderate level of income inequality
Next, we consider the case in which maxf0; 1   g  h < 1=(1 + ). This
inequality implies S2[k(; h)] < 1=2  S2[k(0; h)]. Let us dene kC(h) by
S2[kC(h)] = 1=2. kC(h) is increasing in h since a rise in h increases the density
of individuals in the interval [~h(; kt); ~h(0; kt)], who benet from the policy
that improves the credit markets. The support rate consequently becomes
higher for a given capital level kt, and the curve S2(kt) shifts upward. Hence,
kC(h) is increasing in h. By the same logic discussed in Case 1, t =  if
kA  kt  minfR; kC(h)g and t = 0 otherwise. The dynamic equation of
capital is represented as
kt+1 =
8><>:
0 if 0  kt < kA;
F1(kt; h) if kA  kt  minfkC(h); Rg;
R
2(1 h)

2  h  1
1 k
 
t
  F2(kt; h) if minfkC(h); Rg < kt  R:
(16)
The third line in (16) is valid if the interval (minfkC(h); Rg; R] is non-empty.
Appendix A shows that F2(kt; h) does not intersect with the 45-degree line
for all kt 2 [0; R] and h 2 [0; 1]. As long as income inequality is lower in
122kA < R in (A.2) ensures that F1(kt; h) has a xed point when k(; h)  R.
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Case 2 and kC(h)  R, the dynamics described by (16) correspond to those
in Figure 3 (b).
When income inequality is higher to the point that h is smaller than
the threshold hX , dened by kC(hX) = R, kC(h) < R. Under a relatively
high level of current capital stock such that kt 2 (kC(h); R], higher income
inequality makes the majority of individuals rich enough to invest without
the policy. The policy is thus not practiced, which decreases the capital stock
in the next period. Let us dene another threshold, hY , by F1[kC(hY ); hY ] =
kC(hY ).
13 If hY  h < hX , F1(kt; h) and the 45-degree line intersect, and
the dynamics are illustrated by (a), (b), or (c) in Figure 4. Figure 4 (a)
illustrates a case in which F2[kC(h); h]  kA. For any k0  kA, the economy
converges to the stable steady state k. Figure 4 (b) depicts a case in which
F2[kC(h); h] < kA  F2(R; h). Once kt 2 [kA; kC ], the economy converges to
k, but if kt 2 (kC ; R], then the economy may or may not fall into a poverty
trap, depending on the value of kt 2 (kC ; R]. Figure 4 (c) illustrates a case
in which F2(R; h) < kA. Although the economy has the positive steady state
k, it is caught in a poverty trap once kt 2 (kC ; R].
If income inequality is higher to such an extent that maxf0; 1   g 
h < hY , F1(kt; h) and the 45-degree line do not intersect, and there are three
possible dynamics as shown in Figure 4 (d)-(f).14 If F2[kC(h); h]  kA and
k0  kA, the economy experiences permanent uctuations as illustrated in
Figure 4 (d). Figure 4 (e) corresponds to a case in which F2[kC(h); h] < kA 
F2(R; h). The economy may uctuate permanently, but the condition that
F2[kC(h); h] < kA creates the possibility that it falls into a poverty trap. If
F2(R; h) < kA as depicted in Figure 4 (f), the economy is eventually caught
in a trap for any k0 although the credit markets may be improved for some
13Since both F1[kC(h); h] and kC(h) are increasing and convex in h, F1[kC(1 ); 1 ] =
R=2 > kA = kC(1   ), and F1[kC(1=(1 + )); 1=(1 + )] = R < kB = kC(1=(1 + )),
hY 2 (1  ; hX) is uniquely determined.
14For large , hY can be non-positive and there is no h that satises maxf0; 1   g <
h < hY . In this case, F1(kt; h) and the 45-degree line always intersect.
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periods. Appendix B shows the existence of all dynamics depicted in Figures
4 (a)-(f).
Case 3: High level of income inequality
Lastly, we consider the case under high levels of income inequality: 0  h <
maxf0; 1   g. If   1, Case 3 does not exist and an economy falls under
either Case 1 or 2. If  < 1, h < 1   implies S2[k(0; h)] < 1=2.
A higher level of income inequality reduces the density of individuals,
1=[2(1   h)], which suggests that the policy improving the credit markets
benets only a few individuals. The support rate function S(k) is always
smaller than 1=2, and t = 0 is implemented for any k. The dynamic equation
of capital is represented as
kt+1 =
(
0 if 0  kt < k(0; h);
F2(kt; h) if k(0; h)  kt  R:
(17)
As shown in Figure 5, the government policy is never implemented, and the
economy is always caught in a poverty trap.
Analyzed throughout this section is the relationship between income in-
equality and nancial and economic development. The results can be sum-
marized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 High income inequality causes nancial and economic un-
derdevelopment. If hY  h  1, then the range of capital level under which
t =  is broad and the economy has a positive steady state. In particular, if
(hY <)hX  h  1, t =  for all time periods and the economy converges
to k or R for any k0  kA. If maxf0; 1   g  h < hY , then the economy
has no positive steady state. If 0  h < maxf0; 1   g, then t = 0 for all
time periods and the economy always falls into a poverty trap.
In our model, a high level of income inequality lowers the percentage of
individuals who benet from the policy that improves the credit markets; as
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a result, government policy is less likely to be implemented, and economic
development is retarded. This result is consistent with the evidence found
by Easterly (2001, 2007). Although inuential politico-economic studies by
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) attributed the
negative eect of income inequality on economic development to conicts
over redistribution policies, the mechanism in this paper is quite dierent
from that in those studies. This paper therefore proposes a new explanation
for the negative relationship between inequality and economic development.
As we have focused on R that satises (A.2), it is worth mentioning cases
where (A.2) is dropped out. First, our claim that higher inequality retards
nancial and economic development would be unaected since an economy
is always classied into Case 1, 2, or 3 according to the degree of income
inequality. When R < 2kA, an economy is more likely to be trapped. In
particular, even in Case 1, an economy may be trapped for any k0 since, under
lower R, capital is not accumulated enough to raise labor wages suciently.
When R > kB, in contrast, an economy is less likely to fall into a trap.
Larger R leads to rapid capital accumulation once some individuals start
the project. This greatly increases labor wages of the next generation and
enables many individuals to invest. Even without (A.2), the negative eect
of higher inequality on nancial development remains intact.
6 Conclusion
It is widely recognized that the development of credit markets facilitates
economic growth and development. This paper has investigated conditions
under which a policy that improves credit markets is implemented under
majority voting, and has analyzed interactions between government policy
and economic development. High levels of income inequality and low levels
of capital reduce the number of individuals who benet from the policy and
retard nancial and economic development.
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Although our interest is the analysis of policy determination under ma-
jority voting, some readers may be interested in the analysis under other po-
litical environments. It would be interesting to consider situations in which
income inequality is associated with inequality in political power. Rich in-
dividuals could engage in political activities such as lobbying, and thereby
try to keep credit markets underdeveloped in order to keep their rents, as
Perotti and Volpin (2004) argue. The point of our paper here is that even in
the absence of inequality in political power, improving credit markets is not
always implemented.
As we have assumed a small open economy to simplify our analysis, study-
ing in a closed economy setting would be interesting and important. In
a closed economy, the interest rate would be endogenously determined but
would not necessarily be adjusted to equate aggregate savings to aggregate
investments because of information asymmetry between lenders and borrow-
ers. There should be two regimes according to whether aggregate savings
are underutilized or fully utilized. In Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999),
whose specication of borrowing constraints we have used, an economy can
keep moving between the two regimes and experience permanent uctua-
tions even under an unchanged credit multiplier. Changing the severity of
borrowing constraints would aect the regime into which the economy is put,
and individuals would have to vote with regime switching in mind. Analysis
of policy making and capital accumulation in such environments is left for
future research.
Appendix A. Feature of the Function F2(k; h)
The gradient of the function F2(k; h) at k = k(0; h) is given by
@
@k
F2[k(0; h); h] = 
R
2
2  h
1  hk(0; h)
 1  F 02[k(0; h); h]:
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We denote by (h) the gradient of the line segment that connects the points
(k(0; h); 0) and (R=2; R=2), and denote by (h) the dierence between the
inverse of F 02[k(0; h); h] and that of (h):
(h) =
1
F 02[k(0; h); h]
  1
(h)
=
2
R

1  h
(2  h) + 1

1
1  
1
2  h
 1

  1:
Simple calculations show that (h) is increasing in h, and thus, the value of
(h) is minimized at h = 0. Since R is assumed to be smaller than kB,
(0) = 2

1
2
+ 1

1
2
 1
 kB
R
  1 > 2

1
2
+ 1

1
2
 1

  1:
For any  2 (1=2; 1), 2[1=(2) + 1](1=2)1=   1 > 0, which means that the
value of (h) is always positive. Hence, F 02[k(0; h); h] < (h) for all h 2 [0; 1),
and F2(k; h) and the 45-degree line never intersect (see Figure A).
Appendix B. Existence of the Dynamics of Cap-
ital in Case 2
In this section, we show the existence of all dynamics depicted in Figures
4 (a)-(f), focusing on the features of kC(h), F1[kC(h); h], F2[kC(h); h], and
F2(R; h). First, note that whereas kC(h), F1[kC(h); h], and F2[kC(h); h] are
increasing in h, F2(R; h) is decreasing in h ((A.2) ensures this), and that
kC(h) and F1[kC(h); h] satisfy the following:
kC(1  ) = kA; kC

1
1 + 

= kB;
F1[kC(1  ); 1  ] = R
2
; F1

kC

1
1 + 

;
1
1 + 

= R:
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We then dene hZ by
F2[kC(hZ); hZ ] = kA:
It is clear that F2[kC(h); h]  kA if and only if h  hZ .
Figure B (a) depicts kC(h), F1[kC(h); h], F2[kC(h); h], and F2(R; h) in
the case where R is slightly smaller than kB. Since F2(R; h) = kB=2 > kA
when R = kB, the continuity of F2(R; h) with respect to R ensures that
F2(R; h) > kA for any h 2 [1 ; hX) as long as R is slightly smaller than kB.
Furthermore, hZ < hY = hX = 1=(1 + ) when R = kB. By the continuity
of hX , hY , and hZ with respect to R, hZ < hY < hX when R is slightly
smaller than kB. When hY  h < hX , F2[kC(h); h] > kA, and F1(k; h) and
the 45-degree line intersect. Thus, the dynamics of capital is depicted as in
Figure 4 (a). When hZ  h < hY (1     h < hZ), F2[kC(h); h]  kA
(F2[kC(h); h] < kA), and the function F1(k; h) and the 45-degree line have no
intersection, and thus, the dynamics of capital is depicted as in Figure 4 (d)
(Figure 4 (e)).
Next, suppose that R is slightly larger than 2kA. Figure B (b) depicts
kC(h), F1[kC(h); h], F2[kC(h); h], and F2(R; h) in such a case. Under (A.2)
and R = 2kA, F2(R; h) < kA for any h 2 [1 ; hX). By the continuity of the
function F2(R; h) with respect to R, F2(R; h) < kA for any h 2 [1   ; hX)
as long as R is slightly larger than 2kA. Furthermore, hX < hZ = 1=(1 + )
for R = 2kA. This implies that hX < hZ when R is slightly larger than
2kA. When hY  h < hX , F1(k; h) and the 45-degree line intersect, and the
dynamics is depicted as in Figure 4 (c). When 1    h < hY , in contrast,
F1(k; h) and the 45-degree line do not intersect, and the dynamics of capital
is depicted as in Figure 4 (f).
Last, we show that there exists dynamics depicted as in Figure 4 (b). Note
that the functions hX and hZ are increasing and decreasing in R, respectively,
and that hX < hZ when R = 2kA and hX > hZ when R = kB. Thus, there
exists a productivity parameter, R, which makes hX = hZ (see Figure B (c)).
When R = R and hY  h < hX = hZ , F1[kC(h); h] < kA < F2( R; h), and
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F1(k; h) and the 45-degree line intersect. Thus, the dynamics of capital is
depicted as in Figure 4 (b).
Figure B illustrates the case where 1  > 0, which is not necessarily the
case. However, it does not matter because we just aim to prove the existence
of all the dynamics in Case 2.
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